CCPR/C/GC/35 the individual is entitled to legal assistance, which should in principle be by counsel of choice.103 35. Incommunicado detention that prevents prompt presentation before a judge inherently violates paragraph 3.104 Depending on its duration and other facts, incommunicado detention may also violate other rights under the Covenant, including articles 6, 7, 10 and 14.105 States parties should permit and facilitate access to counsel for detainees in criminal cases from the outset of their detention. 106 36. Once the individual has been brought before the judge, the judge must decide whether the individual should be released or remanded in custody for additional investigation or to await trial. If there is no lawful basis for continuing the detention, the judge must order release.107 If additional investigation or trial is justified, the judge must decide whether the individual should be released (with or without conditions) pending further proceedings because detention is not necessary, an issue addressed more fully by the second sentence of paragraph 3. In the view of the Committee, detention on remand should not involve a return to police custody, but rather to a separate facility under different authority, where risks to the rights of the detainee can be more easily mitigated. 37. The second requirement expressed in the first sentence of paragraph 3 is that the person detained is entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. That requirement applies specifically to periods of pretrial detention, that is, detention between the time of arrest and the time of judgment at first instance.108 Extremely prolonged pretrial detention may also jeopardize the presumption of innocence under article 14, paragraph 2.109 Persons who are not released pending trial must be tried as expeditiously as possible, to the extent consistent with their rights of defence. 110 The reasonableness of any delay in bringing the case to trial has to be assessed in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the complexity of the case, the conduct of the accused during the proceeding and the manner in which the matter was dealt with by the executive and judicial authorities.111 Impediments to the completion of the investigation may justify additional time, 112 but general conditions of understaffing or budgetary constraint do not. 113 When delays become necessary, the judge must reconsider alternatives to pretrial detention.114 Pretrial detention of juveniles should be 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 See concluding observations: Kenya (CCPR/C/KEN/CO/3, 2012), para. 19; see also article 14, paragraph 3 (d); Body of Principles (note 102 above), principle 11. 1297/2004, Medjnoune v. Algeria, para. 8.7. 1781/2008, Berzig v. Algeria, paras. 8.4, 8.5 and 8.8; 176/1984, Lafuente Peñarrieta v. Bolivia, para. 16. General comment No. 32, paras. 32, 34 and 38; concluding observations: Togo (CCPR/C/TGO/CO/4, 2011), para. 19; paragraph 58 below. See concluding observations: Tajikistan (CCPR/CO/84/TJK, 2005), para. 12; 647/1995, Pennant v. Jamaica, para. 8.2. 1397/2005, Engo v. Cameroon, para. 7.2. On the relationship between article 9, paragraph 3, and article 14, paragraph 3 (c), in that respect, see general comment No. 32, para. 61. 788/1997, Cagas v. Philippines, para. 7.3. General comment No. 32, para. 35; 818/1998, Sextus v. Trinidad and Tobago, para. 7.2. 1085/2002, Taright v. Algeria, paras. 8.2–8.4; 386/1989, Koné v. Senegal, para. 8.6; see also 677/1996, Teesdale v. Trinidad and Tobago, para. 9.3 (delay of seventeen months violated paragraph 3); 614/1995, Thomas v. Jamaica, para. 9.6 (delay of nearly fourteen months did not violate paragraph 3); general comment No. 32, para. 35 (discussing factors relevant to reasonableness of delay in criminal proceedings). 721/1997, Boodoo v. Trinidad and Tobago, para. 6.2. 336/1988, Fillastre and Bizouarn v. Bolivia, para. 6.5; 818/1998, Sextus v. Trinidad and Tobago, para. 4.2 and 7.2. 1085/2002, Taright v. Algeria, para. 8.3. 11