CCPR/C/GC/34 necessary.75 In this regard, the Committee recalls that the scope of this freedom is not to be assessed by reference to a “margin of appreciation” 76 and in order for the Committee to carry out this function, a State party, in any given case, must demonstrate in specific fashion the precise nature of the threat to any of the enumerated grounds listed in paragraph 3 that has caused it to restrict freedom of expression. 77 Limitative scope of restrictions on freedom of expression in certain specific areas 37. Among restrictions on political discourse that have given the Committee cause for concern are the prohibition of door-to-door canvassing, 78 restrictions on the number and type of written materials that may be distributed during election campaigns, 79 blocking access during election periods to sources, including local and international media, of political commentary,80 and limiting access of opposition parties and politicians to media outlets. 81 Every restriction should be compatible with paragraph 3. However, it may be legitimate for a State party to restrict political polling imminently preceding an election in order to maintain the integrity of the electoral process. 82 38. As noted earlier in paragraphs 13 and 20, concerning the content of political discourse, the Committee has observed that in circumstances of public debate concerning public figures in the political domain and public institutions, the value placed by the Covenant upon uninhibited expression is particularly high. 83 Thus, the mere fact that forms of expression are considered to be insulting to a public figure is not sufficient to justify the imposition of penalties, albeit public figures may also benefit from the provisions of the Covenant. 84 Moreover, all public figures, including those exercising the highest political authority such as heads of state and government, are legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition. 85 Accordingly, the Committee expresses concern regarding laws on such matters as, lese majesty,86 desacato,87 disrespect for authority,88 disrespect for flags and symbols, defamation of the head of state 89 and the protection of the honour of public officials,90 and laws should not provide for more severe penalties solely on the basis of the 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 See communication No. 518/1992, Sohn v. Republic of Korea . See communication No. 511/1992, Ilmari Länsman, et al. v. Finland, Views adopted on 14 October 1993. See communications Nos. 518/92, Sohn v. Republic of Korea; No. 926/2000, Shin v. Republic of Korea,. Concluding observations on Japan (CCPR/C/JPN/CO/5). Ibid. Concluding observations on Tunisia (CCPR/C/TUN/CO/5). Concluding observations on Togo (CCPR/CO/76/TGO); concluding observations on Moldova (CCPR/CO/75/MDA). See communication No. 968/2001, Kim v. Republic of Korea, Views adopted on 14 March 1996. See communication No. 1180/2003, Bodrozic v. Serbia and Montenegro, Views adopted on 31 October 2005. Ibid. See communication No. 1128/2002, Marques v. Angola. See communications Nos. 422-424/1990, Aduayom et al. v. Togo, Views adopted on 30 June 1994. Concluding observations on the Dominican Republic (CCPR/CO/71/DOM). Concluding observations on Honduras (CCPR/C/HND/CO/1). See concluding observations on Zambia (CCPR/ZMB/CO/3), para.25. See concluding observations on Costa Rica (CCPR/C/CRI/CO/5), para. 11. 9