CCPR/C/GC/34 support of a labour dispute, including for the convening of a national strike, was not permissible on the grounds of national security. 67 31. On the basis of maintenance of public order (ordre public) it may, for instance, be permissible in certain circumstances to regulate speech-making in a particular public place. 68 Contempt of court proceedings relating to forms of expression may be tested against the public order (ordre public) ground. In order to comply with paragraph 3, such proceedings and the penalty imposed must be shown to be warranted in the exercise of a court’s power to maintain orderly proceedings.69 Such proceedings should not in any way be used to restrict the legitimate exercise of defence rights. 32. The Committee observed in general comment No. 22, that “the concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, limitations... for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition”. Any such limitations must be understood in the light of universality of human rights and the principle of non-discrimination 33. Restrictions must be “necessary” for a legitimate purpose. Thus, for instance, a prohibition on commercial advertising in one language, with a view to protecting the language of a particular community, violates the test of necessity if the protection could be achieved in other ways that do not restrict freedom of expression.70 On the other hand, the Committee has considered that a State party complied with the test of necessity when it transferred a teacher who had published materials that expressed hostility toward a religious community to a non-teaching position in order to protect the right and freedom of children of that faith in a school district.71 34. Restrictions must not be overbroad. The Committee observed in general comment No. 27 that “restrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportionality; they must be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve their protective function; they must be proportionate to the interest to be protected…The principle of proportionality has to be respected not only in the law that frames the restrictions but also by the administrative and judicial authorities in applying the law”.72 The principle of proportionality must also take account of the form of expression at issue as well as the means of its dissemination. For instance, the value placed by the Covenant upon uninhibited expression is particularly high in the circumstances of public debate in a democratic society concerning figures in the public and political domain.73 35. When a State party invokes a legitimate ground for restriction of freedom of expression, it must demonstrate in specific and individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat, and the necessity and proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular by establishing a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the threat.74 36. The Committee reserves to itself an assessment of whether, in a given situation, there may have been circumstances which made a restriction of freedom of expression 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 8 See communication No. 518/1992, Sohn v. Republic of Korea, Views adopted on 18 March 1994. See communication No. 1157/2003, Coleman v. Australia. See communication No. 1373/2005, Dissanayake v. Sri Lanka. See communication No. 359, 385/89, Ballantyne , Davidson and McIntyre v. Canada. See communication No. 736/97, Ross v. Canada, Views adopted on 17 July 2006. General comment No. 27, para. 14. See also Communications No. 1128/2002, Marques v. Angola; No. 1157/2003, Coleman v. Australia. See communication No. 1180/2003, Bodrozic v. Serbia and Montenegro, Views adopted on 31 October 2005. See communication No. 926/2000, Shin v. Republic of Korea .