CCPR/C/GC/35 on the nature of the relevant circumstances, before the individual is entitled to take proceedings again on similar grounds. 137 44. “Unlawful” detention includes both detention that violates domestic law and detention that is incompatible with the requirements of article 9, paragraph 1, or with any other relevant provision of the Covenant.138 While domestic legal systems may establish differing methods for ensuring court review of detention, paragraph 4 requires that there be a judicial remedy for any detention that is unlawful on one of those grounds.139 For example, the power of a family court to order release of a child from detention that is not in the child’s best interests may satisfy the requirements of paragraph 4 in relevant cases.140 45. Paragraph 4 entitles the individual to take proceedings before “a court,” which should ordinarily be a court within the judiciary. Exceptionally, for some forms of detention, legislation may provide for proceedings before a specialized tribunal, which must be established by law and must either be independent of the executive and legislative branches or enjoy judicial independence in deciding legal matters in proceedings that are judicial in nature.141 46. Paragraph 4 leaves the option of taking proceedings to the persons being detained or those acting on their behalf; unlike paragraph 3, it does not require automatic initiation of review by the authorities detaining an individual. 142 Laws that exclude a particular category of detainees from the review required by paragraph 4 violate the Covenant.143 Practices that render such review effectively unavailable to an individual, including incommunicado detention, also amount to a violation.144 To facilitate effective review, detainees should be afforded prompt and regular access to counsel. Detainees should be informed, in a language they understand, of their right to take proceedings for a decision on the lawfulness of their detention.145 47. Persons deprived of liberty are entitled not merely to take proceedings, but to receive a decision, and without delay. The refusal by a competent court to take a decision on a petition for the release of a detained person violates paragraph 4.146 The adjudication of the case should take place as expeditiously as possible. 147 Delays attributable to the petitioner do not count as judicial delay.148 48. The Covenant does not require that a court decision upholding the lawfulness of detention be subject to appeal. If a State party does provide for appeal or further instances, 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 14 Ibid. (annual review of post-conviction preventive detention); 754/1997, A. v. New Zealand, para. 7.3 (regular review of hospitalization); 291/1988, Torres v. Finland, para. 7.4 (review every two weeks of detention for extradition). 1255,1256,1259,1260,1266,1268,1270,1288/2004, Shams et al. v. Australia, para. 7.3. Ibid. 1069/2002, Bakhtiyari v. Australia, para. 9.5. 1090/2002, Rameka v. New Zealand, para. 7.4 (discussing ability of Parole Board to act in judicial fashion as a court); 291/1988, Torres v. Finland, para. 7.2 (finding review by the Minister of the Interior insufficient); 265/1987, Vuolanne v. Finland, para. 9.6 (finding review by a superior military officer insufficient); general comment No. 32, paras. 18–22. 373/1989, Stephens v. Jamaica, para. 9.7. R.1/4, Torres Ramírez v. Uruguay, para. 18; 1449/2006, Umarov v. Uzbekistan, para. 8.6. R.1/5, Hernández Valentini de Bazzano et al. v. Uruguay, para. 10; 1751/2008, Aboussedra v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, para. 7.6; 1061/2002, Fijalkowska v. Poland, para. 8.4 (State’s failures frustrated the ability of a patient to challenge involuntary committal). See Body of Principles (note 102 above), principles 13–14. 1128/2002, Marques de Morais v. Angola, para. 6.5. 291/1988, Torres v. Finland, para. 7.3. 1051/2002, Ahani v. Canada, para. 10.3.