CCPR/C/GC/35 32. Paragraph 3 requires, firstly, that any person arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power. That requirement applies in all cases without exception and does not depend on the choice or ability of the detainee to assert it. 89 The requirement applies even before formal charges have been asserted, so long as the person is arrested or detained on suspicion of criminal activity. 90 The right is intended to bring the detention of a person in a criminal investigation or prosecution under judicial control. 91 If a person already detained on one criminal charge is also ordered to be detained to face an unrelated criminal charge, the person must be promptly brought before a judge for control of the second detention.92 It is inherent to the proper exercise of judicial power that it be exercised by an authority which is independent, objective and impartial in relation to the issues dealt with. 93 Accordingly, a public prosecutor cannot be considered as an officer exercising judicial power under paragraph 3.94 33. While the exact meaning of “promptly” may vary depending on objective circumstances,95 delays should not exceed a few days from the time of arrest. 96 In the view of the Committee, 48 hours is ordinarily sufficient to transport the individual and to prepare for the judicial hearing;97 any delay longer than 48 hours must remain absolutely exceptional and be justified under the circumstances. 98 Longer detention in the custody of law enforcement officials without judicial control unnecessarily increases the risk of illtreatment.99 Laws in most States parties fix precise time limits, sometimes shorter than 48 hours, and those limits should also not be exceeded. An especially strict standard of promptness, such as 24 hours, should apply in the case of juveniles. 100 34. The individual must be brought to appear physically before the judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power.101 The physical presence of detainees at the hearing gives the opportunity for inquiry into the treatment that they received in custody 102 and facilitates immediate transfer to a remand detention centre if continued detention is ordered. It thus serves as a safeguard for the right to security of person and the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. In the hearing that ensues, and in subsequent hearings at which the judge assesses the legality or necessity of the detention, 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 10 1787/2008, Kovsh v. Belarus, paras. 7.3–7.5. 1128/2002, Marques de Morais v. Angola, paras. 6.3–6.4; 1096/2002, Kurbanova v. Tajikistan, para. 7.2. 1914–1916/2009, Musaev v. Uzbekistan, para. 9.3. 635/1995, Morrison v. Jamaica, paras. 22.2–22.3; 762/1997, Jensen v. Australia, para. 6.3. 521/1992, Kulomin v. Hungary, para. 11.3. See ibid.; 1547/2007, Torobekov v. Kyrgyzstan, para. 6.2; 1278/2004, Reshetnikov v. Russian Federation, para. 8.2; concluding observations: Tajikistan (CCPR/CO/84/TJK, 2005), para. 12. 702/1996, McLawrence v. Jamaica, para. 5.6; 2120/2011, Kovalev v. Belarus, para. 11.3. 1128/2002, Marques de Morais v. Angola, para. 6.3; 277/1988, Terán Jijón v. Ecuador, para. 5.3 (five days not prompt); 625/1995, Freemantle v. Jamaica, para. 7.4 (four days not prompt). 1787/2008, Kovsh v. Belarus, paras. 7.3–7.5. Ibid.; see also 336/1988, Fillastre and Bizouarn v. Bolivia, para. 6.4 (budgetary constraints did not justify 10-day delay). See concluding observations: Hungary (CCPR/CO/74/HUN, 2002), para. 8. Committee on the Rights of the Child, general comment No. 10, para. 83. 289/1988, Wolf v. Panama, para. 6.2; 613/1995, Leehong v. Jamaica, para. 9.5. Regarding the phrase “other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power,” see paragraph 32 above. See Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 43/173, principle 37.