CCPR/C/GC/32 Page 12 38. Third, article 14, paragraph 3 (d) guarantees the right to have legal assistance assigned to accused persons whenever the interests of justice so require, and without payment by them in any such case if they do not have sufficient means to pay for it. The gravity of the offence is important in deciding whether counsel should be assigned “in the interest of justice”77 as is the existence of some objective chance of success at the appeals stage.78 In cases involving capital punishment, it is axiomatic that the accused must be effectively assisted by a lawyer at all stages of the proceedings.79 Counsel provided by the competent authorities on the basis of this provision must be effective in the representation of the accused. Unlike in the case of privately retained lawyers,80 blatant misbehaviour or incompetence, for example the withdrawal of an appeal without consultation in a death penalty case,81 or absence during the hearing of a witness in such cases82 may entail the responsibility of the State concerned for a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (d), provided that it was manifest to the judge that the lawyer’s behaviour was incompatible with the interests of justice.83 There is also a violation of this provision if the court or other relevant authorities hinder appointed lawyers from fulfilling their task effectively.84 39. Paragraph 3 (e) of article 14 guarantees the right of accused persons to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against them and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on their behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against them. As an application of the principle of equality of arms, this guarantee is important for ensuring an effective defence by the accused and their counsel and thus guarantees the accused the same legal powers of compelling the attendance of witnesses and of examining or cross-examining any witnesses as are available to the prosecution. It does not, however, provide an unlimited right to obtain the attendance of any witness requested by the accused or their counsel, but only a right to have witnesses admitted that are relevant for the defence, and to be given a proper opportunity to question and challenge witnesses against them at some stage of the proceedings. Within these limits, and subject to the limitations on the use of statements, confessions and other evidence obtained in violation of article 7,85 it is primarily for the domestic legislatures of States parties to determine the admissibility of evidence and how their courts assess it. 40. The right to have the free assistance of an interpreter if the accused cannot understand or speak the language used in court as provided for by article 14, paragraph 3 (f) enshrines another aspect of the principles of fairness and equality of arms in criminal proceedings.86 This right arises at all stages of the oral proceedings. It applies to aliens as well as to nationals. However, accused persons whose mother tongue differs from the official court language are, in Communication No. 646/1995, Lindon v. Australia, para. 6.5. Communication No. 341/1988, Z.P. v. Canada, para. 5.4. 79 Communications No. 985/2001, Aliboeva v. Tajikistan, para. 6.4; No. 964/2001, Saidova v. Tajikistan, para. 6.8; No. 781/1997, Aliev v. Ukraine, para. 7.3; No. 554/1993, LaVende v. Trinidad and Tobago, para. 58. 80 Communication No. 383/1989, H.C. v. Jamaica, para. 6.3. 81 Communication No. 253/1987, Kelly v. Jamaica, para. 9.5. 82 Communication No. 838/1998, Hendricks v. Guyana, para. 6.4. For the case of an absence of an author’s legal representative during the hearing of a witness in a preliminary hearing see Communication No. 775/1997, Brown v. Jamaica, para. 6.6. 83 Communications No. 705/1996, Taylor v. Jamaica, para. 6.2 ; No. 913/2000, Chan v. Guyana, para. 6.2; No. 980/2001, Hussain v. Mauritius, para. 6.3. 84 Communication No. 917/2000, Arutyunyan v. Uzbekistan, para. 6.3. 85 See para. 6 above. 86 Communication No. 219/1986, Guesdon v. France, para. 10.2. 77 78