CCPR/C/GC/32 Page 11 circumstances of each case,72 taking into account mainly the complexity of the case, the conduct of the accused, and the manner in which the matter was dealt with by the administrative and judicial authorities. In cases where the accused are denied bail by the court, they must be tried as expeditiously as possible.73 This guarantee relates not only to the time between the formal charging of the accused and the time by which a trial should commence, but also the time until the final judgement on appeal.74 All stages, whether in first instance or on appeal must take place “without undue delay.” 36. Article 14, paragraph 3 (d) contains three distinct guarantees. First, the provision requires that accused persons are entitled to be present during their trial. Proceedings in the absence of the accused may in some circumstances be permissible in the interest of the proper administration of justice, i.e. when accused persons, although informed of the proceedings sufficiently in advance, decline to exercise their right to be present. Consequently, such trials are only compatible with article 14, paragraph 3 (d) if the necessary steps are taken to summon accused persons in a timely manner and to inform them beforehand about the date and place of their trial and to request their attendance.75 37. Second, the right of all accused of a criminal charge to defend themselves in person or through legal counsel of their own choosing and to be informed of this right, as provided for by article 14, paragraph 3 (d), refers to two types of defence which are not mutually exclusive. Persons assisted by a lawyer have the right to instruct their lawyer on the conduct of their case, within the limits of professional responsibility, and to testify on their own behalf. At the same time, the wording of the Covenant is clear in all official languages, in that it provides for a defence to be conducted in person “or” with legal assistance of one’s own choosing, thus providing the possibility for the accused to reject being assisted by any counsel. This right to defend oneself without a lawyer is, however not absolute. The interests of justice may, in the case of a specific trial, require the assignment of a lawyer against the wishes of the accused, particularly in cases of persons substantially and persistently obstructing the proper conduct of trial, or facing a grave charge but being unable to act in their own interests, or where this is necessary to protect vulnerable witnesses from further distress or intimidation if they were to be questioned by the accused. However, any restriction of the wish of accused persons to defend themselves must have an objective and sufficiently serious purpose and not go beyond what is necessary to uphold the interests of justice. Therefore, domestic law should avoid any absolute bar against the right to defend oneself in criminal proceedings without the assistance of counsel.76 See e.g. communication No. 818/1998, Sextus v Trinidad and Tobago, para. 7.2 regarding a delay of 22 months between the charging of the accused with a crime carrying the death penalty and the beginning of the trial without specific circumstances justifying the delay. In communication No. 537/1993, Kelly v. Jamaica, para. 5.11, an 18 months delay between charges and beginning of the trial did not violate art. 14, para. 3 (c). See also communication No. 676/1996, Yasseen and Thomas v. Guyana, para. 7.11 (delay of two years between a decision by the Court of Appeal and the beginning of a retrial) and communication No. 938/2000, Siewpersaud, Sukhram, and Persaud v. Trinidad v Tobago, para. 6.2 (total duration of criminal proceedings of almost five years in the absence of any explanation from the State party justifying the delay). 73 Communication No. 818/1998, Sextus v. Trinidad and Tobago, para. 7.2. 74 Communications No. 1089/2002, Rouse v. Philippines, para.7.4; No. 1085/2002, Taright, Touadi, Remli and Yousfi v. Algeria, para. 8.5. 75 Communications No. 16/1977, Mbenge v. Zaire, para. 14.1; No. 699/1996, Maleki v. Italy, para. 9.3. 76 Communication No. 1123/2002, Correia de Matos v. Portugal, paras. 7.4 and 7.5. 72