A/HRC/25/CRP.1 testimony from recent visitors to the border, the Commission also reviewed relevant pictures showing such installations. 398. The SSD, MPS and KPA are all deployed in the border region and closely coordinate their actions to prevent escapes from the DPRK. After Kim Jong-un assumed power, the SSD was also assigned to assume the lead on border control, taking over from the KPA Border Security Command. This move is said to be driven by dissatisfaction over corruption in the army. According to one witness, who has worked with DPRK nationals in China, the authorities frequently switch guards since 2010, making it harder for guards to be bribed for assistance in crossing the border.499 399. KINU reported that from 2009, the SSD implemented new measures against “defectors”, including tighter surveillance over families with members who are missing or have “defected”. Even law enforcement workers were investigated for any relatives who have “defected”, and, if so, they would be removed from their positions. In 2010, a census survey was reportedly carried out conducting an in-depth inspection of “defector families”.500 “Banishment villages” were supposedly designated in remote areas where the “defector families” would be sent to, although this plan appears to have abandoned.501 400. Following the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011, the DPRK increased restrictions on the movements of its citizens during the mourning period, with bed-check inspections being carried out more intensely and every family along the border region required to stand guard in turn. Land mines were reportedly installed along the border in addition to barbed wire fences, and cameras were set up along major defection routes as well as spiked panels with four-inch nails along the banks of the Tumen River.502 401. In November 2013, DPRK authorities were reported to be increasing their surveillance of families of suspected “defectors”, including through the reporting mechanism of the Neighbourhood Watch. It was further reported that “Families with members who have defected or whose whereabouts are unconfirmed must register with their local People’s Security Bureau … It looks like rising numbers of missing persons and defectors have led the authorities to try and block anyone else from defecting by stepping up surveillance and controls.”503 402. Former DPRK security officials indicated that officials may shoot to kill anyone trying to cross the border, a policy which dates back at least to the early 1990s and remains in place.504 A former SSD agent involved in border control indicated that border guards who shoot at DPRK citizens trying to flee the country would not be punished.505 Another former official testified about the killing of a person who illegally crossed the border in January 2011.506 This was also confirmed by the testimony of Mr Kim Young-hwan,507 a humanitarian activist involved in operations to help those who flee the DPRK, as well as another witness, who engages in similar operations.508 Shooting directives appear to have 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 112 TJH010. KINU, White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea (2013), pp. 461-462 footnote 12. Available from http://goodfriendsusa.blogspot.ch/2011/09/north-korea-daily-no-417-august-242011.html. KINU, White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea (2013), pp. 45, 461-463. “People’s Units Working to Limit Defection”, Daily NK, 6 November 2013. Available from http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=11150. TJH015, TJH041, TBG031. TJH015. TBG027. Seoul Public Hearing, 24 August 2013, afternoon. TJH010.